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Abstract
Participation in the public debate constitutes one of the most evident avenues for 
political scientists to demonstrate the social relevance of the discipline. This article 
focuses on two questions: the types of roles political scientists adopt in their public 
interventions and the potential tensions between their public engagement and the 
epistemic norms regulating academic and research activities. We investigate these 
questions in the context of very salient political debates, involving a high degree of 
political confrontation, where basic political beliefs, values, identities, and interests 
are at stake. Focusing on the case of the public debate surrounding the Catalan inde‑
pendence crisis (2010–2018), we demonstrate that in this type of context, (1) politi‑
cal scientists mostly adopt a partisan stance in their public interventions, yet it is 
also frequent that this is combined with the presence of academic elements in their 
discourse; (2) demand side factors (media outlets’ editorial lines) reinforce these 
partisan dynamics. These findings show that opportunities for increasing the social 
relevance of political scientists in these highly contentious contexts might come at 
the price of creating tensions that could erode the legitimacy of political science 
knowledge before the public.
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analysis · Relevance of political science · Roles of political scientists · Secession · 
Spain
 * José Real‑Dato 
 jreal@ual.es
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
 J. Real-Dato et al.
Introduction
Some recent research has shed light on the attitudes and participation of political 
scientists in the public debate. The survey to political scientists in Europe carried 
out in the context of the PROSEPS project (Verzichelli, Real‑Dato, and Vicentini, 
2019)1 has shown that a great majority of political scientists in Europe feel they 
should become involved in public debates as an inherent part of their role as social 
scientists. Moreover, many of them tend to do it in a more or less regular fashion. 
There is also evidence that this involvement is influenced by individual‑level factors, 
such as professional norms, seniority, gender, or the particular country context.
However, there is still a knowledge gap concerning the specifics of the participa‑
tion of political scientists in the public debate. In the introduction to this special 
issue, Real‑Dato and Verzichelli (2021) connect such participation to the issue of 
the social relevance of political science, pointing to three main dimensions of inter‑
est: the involvement of political scientists in partisan discussions, their visibility 
in the public sphere, and the actual impact of their interventions on policy making 
decisions. In this article, we are interested mostly in the first dimension, and, indi‑
rectly, in the second one.
On the one hand, we focus on the types of roles political scientists adopt in their 
public interventions, particularly concerning the display of partisan stances, and 
the potential tensions between the public engagement of political scientists and the 
epistemic norms regulating academic and research activities. On the other hand, we 
examine how partisanship and visibility interact in a context of highly politicised 
and salient debates where basic political beliefs, values, identities, and interests are 
at stake—though we do not evaluate the visibility of political scientists per se.2 In 
theory, the high degree of media and public attention on these very salient and divi‑
sive issues (particularly where they fit the disciplinary knowledge of political sci‑
ence) may increase the opportunities for public debate‑oriented political scientists 
(Real‑Dato and Verzichelli 2021). Our basic argument is that such visibility will 
come at the price of subordinating the academic to the partisan “hat”.
This article investigates these issues by focusing on Spanish political scientists 
participating in the media in relation to the internal crisis produced in Spain by the 
nationalist independence movement in Catalonia between 2012 and 2018. This cri‑
sis constituted a fully fledged systemic crisis, as it involved putting into question 
the existing territorial integrity and constitutional configuration of the Spanish state. 
Through analysing the content of the interventions of political scientists in major 
national and Catalan newspapers, we shed light on the different roles adopted by 
participants and how normative tensions are solved.
1 The survey was carried out in 2018 in the context of the COST Action “Professionalisation and Social 
Impact of European Political Science” (PROSEPS) (http:// prose ps. unibo. it/ prose ps/). The survey was 
carried out in 37 European countries (plus Israel and Turkey) among academic political scientists. The 
total number of respondents was 2354.
2 This would require an entirely different research design, analysing participation of academic political 
scientists in the context of all the interventions in this public debate. However, this is beyond our pur‑
poses in this article.
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The article is structured as follows. The following section presents the theoreti‑
cal framework that underpins the expectations we test in the article about the roles 
of political scientists in highly contentious public debates and the influence of the 
media system. Then, we provide some context, by introducing the basic features of 
the Catalan independence crisis. The next two sections constitute the core of the 
article. After describing the process of data collection and coding, we analyse the 
data to test the expectations developed in the theoretical section. The article finishes 
with a summary of the findings and a reflection on further avenues of inquiry.
Political scientists’ roles in the public sphere on highly contentious 
issues
Most academic political scientists generally consider that their role as social sci‑
entists implies their engagement into public discussion. This attitude appears more 
as an internal normative imperative (Verzichelli, Real‑Dato, and Vicentini, 2019) 
than a result of external conditionings, yet the increasing pressure put on academic 
researchers by the “impact agenda” (Flinders, 2013; Bandola‑Gill, Brans, and Flin‑
ders, 2021) constitutes an additional incentive.
But the approach to such engagement varies. Schematically, political scientists 
may wear different “hats” when they get involved in the public debate. First, they 
may intervene in the public debate wearing the scientist/expert “hat”, applying dis‑
ciplinary knowledge to illuminate certain aspects of a specific issue for the general 
public (observer role, see the introductory article to this special issue). They may 
also point to courses of action (existing or in theory), but avoiding at any time to 
show any sympathies for any particular positioning or actor (broker role). In this 
context, interventions prioritise epistemic norms guiding the production of scientific 
knowledge, such as methodological rigour and value neutrality over political posi‑
tionings or sympathies.
In contrast to this approach, interventions in the public debate may explicitly 
advocate specific political positions or interests. In this partisan role, political sci‑
entists’ discourse is entirely designed to support a political stance, while norms that 
regulate the production of scientific knowledge might be entirely neglected.
But, between the ideal type roles of the scientific/expert and the partisan advo‑
cate, there are grey zones. Some authors contend that partisanship may slip inad‑
vertently into the discourse even when individuals try to stick to the pure scientist/
expert role (Shapiro, 1984). This unintended (and unavoidable) partisanship in pub‑
lic interventions may surface in the selection of issues, the vocabulary in use or if 
discourses reproduce specific social constructions (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). 
A person familiar with the issue at hand could identify these situations as hidden 
partisanship. However, since such identification could raise problems of empirical 
validity for its extreme dependence on subjective judgement, we focus only on those 
instances where the authors’ political positioning can be explicitly identified in the 
text.
Even if explicitly adopting a partisan role, individuals may also appear in 
their interventions wearing the scientist/expert “hat”. Here, individuals act as 
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politically oriented experts, using scientific arguments or evidence in parallel to 
arguments supporting a specific political position. These situations put pressure 
on the norms regulating scientific activities. Publicly stating a political position‑
ing seems to contradict the basic scientific epistemic norm of value neutrality, 
particularly if it is evident that scientific evidence or theories are instrumental 
to the political argument. In this context, scientific knowledge used in the public 
debate risks being deemed tainted, even if such knowledge is based on evidence 
obtained through rigorous methods and the author clearly differentiates scientific 
facts or arguments from values.
These tensions and suspicions about the use of scientific knowledge in the pub‑
lic debate should rise when those debates turn around highly contentious issues. 
The public policy literature has shown that rational learning (using new evidence 
to change or adjust existing policy beliefs) is less likely when the levels of con‑
flict within policy subsystems are high–that is, when basic policy beliefs are at 
stake or questioned (Jenkins‑Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, and Ingold, 2017). In 
these contexts, individuals adopt a defensive stance, where scientific evidence 
is much likely to be used to support and reinforce existing positions, while new 
information disputing one’s basic beliefs is rejected [see also Majone (1989)]. In 
short, in situations of high conflict, partisanship would usually trump science in 
the policy process.
Similarly, we should expect that the partisan role predominates when political 
scientists intervene in highly contentious public debates. Though we do not deny 
that in these contexts political scientists may intervene in a dispassionate fashion—
as observers or brokers, just wearing the scientist/expert “hat”—there are several 
reasons supporting that expectation. First, political scientists, as most members 
of a political community, also hold basic political beliefs about the nature of that 
community, how it should be ruled, which political and social values should pre‑
dominate, etc. These basic beliefs usually convey intense emotional feelings and 
identifications, which make the distortion of rational arguments more likely, by 
emphasising affective traits over evidence or through other cognitive biases, such as 
confirmation or “myside” biases (Kahneman, 2011; Mercier and Sperber, 2017). In 
addition, many of those beliefs are of a normative nature and, therefore, are immune 
to scientific empirical evaluation and incommensurable with other normative beliefs, 
which eventually might reinforce those biases.
Beyond these reasons, factors linked to the structure and dynamics of mass media 
system explain the expected predominance of political scientists wearing the par‑
tisan “hat” in public debates on highly contentious issues. In media systems char‑
acterised by “political parallelism” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), media outlets are 
prone to hold identifiable political positions, close to those of specific political par‑
ties or the government. In those politicised contexts, highly contentious issues are 
likely to resonate in the outlets’ content in line with their political stance. Therefore, 
we can expect that politicised media reinforce conflictual dynamics present in the 
public debate by giving a voice to individuals (in our case, academic political sci‑
entists) aligned with their editorial positioning. Indirectly, this might enhance the 
visibility of these political scientists adopting a partisan “hat”.
From these arguments, we derive the following hypotheses:
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1. The participation of political scientists in highly politicised debates will be char‑
acterised by a predominance of a partisan stance, both collectively and at the 
individual level;
2. Such partisan stance will be more evident among those scholars more visible in 
the public debate;
3. Given the high politicisation of the media system, partisan interventions will be 
grouped in different media according to their positioning in the debate.
We test these hypotheses using the case of the role of Spanish academic political 
scientists during the internal crisis produced by the nationalist independence move‑
ment in Catalonia between 2012 and 2018 (what we will call the “Catalan inde‑
pendence crisis”). As in other cases analysed in this Special Issue, like those of the 
Greek bailout referendum (Tsirbas and Zirganou‑Kazolea, 2021) or the Italian con‑
stitutional referendum (Vicentini and Pritoni, 2021), this crisis has all the charac‑
teristics of a highly contentious issue. But while those cases focus, respectively, on 
major political decisions or institutional reforms, the Catalan independence crisis 
constitutes a fully fledged systemic crisis involving a questioning of Spain’s terri‑
torial integrity, as a significant part of the citizens and political actors in Catalo‑
nia demanded (and manoeuvred for) the right to secede this territory from Spain 
and establish a new independent state. We review this context in the next section. 
Besides, the high level of politicisation of the Spanish media system (Chaqués‑Bon‑
afont, Palau, and Baumgartner, 2015; Büchel et al, 2016), which was manifested in 
coverage of the Catalan independence crisis, makes the case suitable to test whether 
media dynamics reinforce partisanship in public debates.3
The context: the Catalan independence crisis
In this section, we offer just a brief analytic overview of the main events and politi‑
cal dynamics of the Catalan independence crisis during the analysed period (2010‑
2018). For a more detailed narrative, sources and chronology focusing on the main 
events in this crisis, see the online supplementary documentation.
We distinguish three main periods: (1) a preparation period (“pre‑procés”), from 
2010 to the November 2012 Catalan election; (2) the “procés period”, from late 
2012 to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on 27 October 2017; and 
(3) the post‑procés period, from that date onwards.
3 Spain is classified by Hallin and Mancini (2004) among pluralist polarised systems. These systems 
“[tend] to be associated with a high degree of political parallelism: newspapers are typically identified 
with ideological tendencies, and traditions of advocacy and commentary‑oriented journalism are often 
strong.” (2004: 61). Also, “the press is marked by a strong focus on political life (…). Instrumentaliza‑
tion of the media by the government, by political parties, and by industrialists with political ties is com‑
mon. Public broadcasting tends to follow the government or [parliament] (…). The state plays a large 
role as an owner, regulator, and funder of media, though its capacity to regulate effectively is often lim‑
ited.” (2004: 73).
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Most analysts4 point to the 2010 Spanish Constitutional Court’s (Tribunal Con-
stitucional, TC) ruling on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia as the event 
initiating the Catalan independence crisis. The ruling stroke down key sections of 
the Statute on language, nationality, and judicial powers of the Catalan autonomy, 
a decision that was interpreted among nationalist Catalan parties and civil soci‑
ety sectors as a demonstration that the Spanish state was not able to satisfy their 
demands for the national recognition of Catalonia (Requejo and Sanjaume, 2013). 
This and the claim that Catalonia was treated unfairly by the Spanish state in terms 
of public funding were the two basic lines of argumentation in the strategy aimed 
at mobilising support for secession  developed by pro‑independence parties such 
as ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya— Catalan Republican Left) or CUP 
(Candidaturas de Unitat Popular—People’s Unity Candidacies),  as well as civil 
society organisations, such as Òmnium Cultural and ANC (Assemblea Nacional de 
Catalunya—National Assembly of Catalonia). This strategy proved very successful, 
as illustrated by the massive 2012 Diada demonstration and the growth, between 
2010 and 2012, of support for independence, which experienced a quantum leap 
from minority status to almost a majority among Catalans. This series of events and 
the fear to lose its hegemony within the nationalist field led CiU (Convergència i 
Unió—Convergence and Union), the nationalist coalition governing Catalonia since 
December 2010, to veer towards secessionist positions. Thus, CiU’s manifesto for 
the November 2012 Catalan election included a defense of Catalonia’s right to self‑
determination (Barrio and Rodríguez‑Teruel, 2017; Barrio and Field, 2018).
The second phase of the independence crisis overlaps with what is popularly 
known as the “procés” (process), which ended on October 2017 with the UDI 
and the intervention of the Catalan institutions by the Spanish government. Ini‑
tially, during the campaign of the 2012 Catalan election, pro‑independence forces 
framed the procés as a path towards realising the legitimate democratic right of the 
citizens in Catalonia to decide about their political future on their own, intendedly 
through a referendum to be held in November 2014. After the TC stopped the ref‑
erendum—which was reduced to a symbolic consultation (López and Sanjaume‑
Calvet, 2020)—the procés was less ambivalently redefined as a process towards 
the construction of an independent Catalan state. This was considered as the only 
path to grant Catalonia the recognition of its sovereign political identity, denied by 
the Spanish state, as well as its economic prosperity. These ideas were central in 
the campaign for the 2015 Catalan elections, which were presented by secessionist 
forces as a plebiscite on the independence of Catalonia.5
The procés period was characterised by a steadily increasing polarisation of the 
Catalan political space along the national dimension (Barrio and Rodríguez‑Teruel, 
2017). After separatist forces failed to win the majority of the popular vote in the 
5 See, for instance, the manifesto of the unitary pro‑independence coalition Junts pel Sí (Together for 
Yes) for the 2015 Catalan election (Junts pel Sí, 2015). Junts pel Sí was integrated by ERC and one of the 
parties that formed the disappeared CiU, Convergència Democrática de Catalunya (CDC).
4 See, for instance, the multiple journalistic accounts about the crisis published during the last years, 
such as Martínez (2016), García (2018), March (2018), Martí (2018), or Álvaro (2019).
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2015 plebiscitary election, during 2016 and 2017 they formed a quite unified front 
(though internal competition for hegemony between CDC and ERC continued). 
Together, they pushed for unilateral secession, ignoring the Spanish legal system 
and the rights of parliamentary minority. Their goal was to force a second referen‑
dum of self‑determination. The referendum finally took place on 1 October 2017, 
although it was declared illegal by the TC. In contrast, the forces opposing secession 
remained much divided. The leftist Podemos (We can) and its regional branch, Cata-
lunya Sí que es Pot (Catalonia, yes we can), granted the right for self‑determination. 
On the opposite side, the Partido Popular (People’s Party, PP) and Ciudadanos (Cit‑
izens) rejected any concession to secessionist parties and emphasised the defence 
of the Spanish constitutional order. In between, the Socialist Party (PSOE) and its 
regional branch, the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya—Socialist Party of 
Catalonia), though also denied secessionist claims, favoured a better accommoda‑
tion of the demands of national recognition by the Spanish state (PSOE, 2013). 
However, when the secessionist procés advanced towards its full realisation during 
2017, the PSOE ultimately backed the PP government when it proposed in October 
2017 to take back the powers the Spanish Constitution granted to the Catalan region 
after the UDI by the Catalan parliament.
The third stage of the independence crisis (the post‑procés period) is character‑
ised, firstly, by the intervention of the Catalan regional autonomy by the Spanish 
government in implementation of the 155 article of the Spanish Constitution, which 
lasted until the formation of the new Catalan government in May 2018. This is also 
the period of the judicial prosecution of the Catalan government and other leaders of 
the procés. Some of them (including the former vice‑president of the Catalan gov‑
ernment) were sentenced on 14 October 2019 for sedition between nine and thirteen 
years of prison. Other leaders, such as former regional president Carles Puigdemont, 
avoided prosecution by fleeing to other European countries.
An additional feature of the post‑procés period is the stalemate in the correlation 
of forces after the December 2017 Catalan election, with a secessionist government 
being supported by a thin parliamentary majority formed by Puigdemont’s JxCat 
(Junts per Catalunya, Together for Catalonia), ERC and CUP, while parties oppos‑
ing independence won the popular vote. Finally, since 2018 there has been a relative 
de‑scalation of the conflict, motivated by the arrival of the PSOE to the Spanish 
government and its parliamentary dependence on an ERC, which showed more open 
to dialogue.
Data and methods
The empirical case study covers the core events in the Catalan independence crisis, 
spanning from the January 2010 until the end of 2018. Opinion pieces published by 
academic political scientists in major commercial national and Catalan conventional 
generalist newspapers constitute our corpus for qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 
2014). Given the difficulties for systematic identification of pertinent instances, we 
exclude interventions in other media outlets (radio or television broadcasts, as well 
as online newspapers). We have also excluded to examine books or book chapters 
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on the topic targeted for non‑academic audience, since the more limited audience of 
this kind of publications usually implies a lower impact on the public opinion.6
The selection of newspapers aims at reflecting the different angles of the debate 
and the plurality of positions, as well as their public relevance. We included the 
three most important (in terms of audience7) generalist newspapers published in 
Madrid (El País, El Mundo, and ABC). In Catalonia, we included two newspapers 
with widely read national editions and published both in Castilian and Catalan (La 
Vanguardia and El Periódico), and the two leading newspapers with an exclusive 
regional scope, Ara and El Punt Avui, published only in Catalan. This later newspa‑
per is the result of the merge, in August 2011 of two previous outlets, El Punt and 
Avui, both of which we have also included in our analysis of the period 2010–July 
2011.
We identified opinion pieces written by academic political scientists using an 
electronic database of Spanish newspapers (MyNews, https:// hemer oteca. mynews. 
es/) in a systematic, multi‑step process (see the online supplementary documen‑
tation). In the end, the corpus contains a total of 371 opinion pieces. We did not 










2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1 Abc 2 Ara 3 Avui 4 El Mundo 5 El Periódico
6 El País 7 El Punt 8 El Punt Avui 9 La Vanguardia
Fig. 1  Distribution of academic political scientists’ interventions across newspapers (2010–2018). 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
6 For example, Guinjoan, Rodon, and Sanjaume (2013) or Coll, Molina, and Arias Maldonado (2018).
7 We used as a reference the audience surveys produced three times a year by the AIMC (Asociación 
para la Investigación de los Medios de Comunicación – Association for Mass Media Research) (http:// 
repor ting. aimc. es/ index. html#/ main/ diari os, accessed 26/04/2020).
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Figure 1 presents the distribution of articles by outlet and year. Most of the texts 
(67.9%) are concentrated in the procés period. More specifically, about a third of 
the articles (35.6%) were written between the 2012 Diada and the failed referendum 
of 2014. The other period where political scientists were more active was between 
the 2015 election and the unilateral declaration of independence (24.3%). Figure 1 
also shows that interventions of academic political scientists on the Catalan seces‑
sion issue mostly appear in Catalan newspapers until 2015, though in the following 
years there is a balance between Madrilenian and Catalan outlets. Finally, interven‑
tions are mainly concentrated in two newspapers, El País (38.5% of articles) and 
Ara (26.7%), published, respectively, in Madrid and Barcelona, and the latter only in 
Catalan language.
Additional descriptive statistics confirm three asymmetries, also revealed by 
the PROSEPS survey (Verzichelli et al., 2019), about the participation of political 
scientists in the public debate. One is the presence of a group of highly engaged 
individuals which account for a great majority of the contributions (we develop this 
below in the text). A second asymmetry refers to gender. Women authored or co‑
authored only 8.6% of the articles. In terms of individual authorship, of all 53 partic‑
ipants, seven were women, and just one of them is among the group of highly active 
authors. Finally, participation of senior scholars is much more frequent (54% of the 
texts were written by full professors).
The units of analysis in the corpus are each of the articles. We coded their content 
across several dimensions, indicated in Table 1. In consideration of the sometimes 
highly interpretative character of the evidence supporting the allocation of some 
codes and, therefore, aiming at maximising the reliability of the coding process, we 
opted for the strategy suggested by Guest, MacQueen, and Namey (2012: 89). Con‑
sequently, two of the authors coded separately every article in the corpus. Then, we 
compared results and discussed dissimilarities thoroughly until agreeing one code. 
In case of no agreement, the default coding option was the absence of the feature 
in the article (“no” or “not mentioned”). Finally, since the purpose was to judge the 
interventions of political scientists entirely by their content and avoid any bias from 
contextual factors, we decided to eliminate dates and authors’ names from the cod‑
ing template and shuffle the articles for analysis, so they were coded in a random 
sequence.
Analysis
Mapping partisanship in the public debate
Our first theoretical expectation concerns the predominance of the partisan role 
among political scientists participating in public debate regarding the Catalan inde‑
pendence crisis. Here, we consider as “partisan” those articles in which the authors 
clearly exhibit a preference for a political position or interest in the debate. We oper‑
ationalised this in our coding procedure through the variable “Side” (see Table 1), 
where partisan categories correspond to those articles clearly aligned (as judged 
by the coders) with (1) pro‑independence/sovereigntist positions favouring the 
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secessionist option; (2) anti‑independence/constitutionalist positions supporting the 
status quo, and (3) “third way” alternatives, contrary to the secession of Catalonia 
from Spain, but in favour of some kind of agreement leading to institutional reforms 
(i.e. federal reform) that imply an advancement in self‑government and political rec‑
ognition of Catalonia.
Figure 2 presents evidence of the validity of this measure by means of multiple 
correspondence analysis (MCA). MCA is a statistical technique used to detect and 
represent underlying structures in categorical data (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010). 
The solution plot presented in Fig. 2 includes variables measuring several of the con‑
tent‑analytic dimensions coded in the texts (criticism, legitimacy, blame, and nature 
of Catalan society). We identified two meaningful dimensions. A vertical dimension 
(politicisation) discriminates between non‑evaluative categories and political eval‑
uative categories. The horizontal dimension (side), in turn, differentiates between 
political positions. One side of the plot is populated with categories that imply the 
legitimacy of pro‑independence positions, putting the blame on the Spanish gov‑
ernment and parties, and asserting the illegitimacy of constitutional positions and 
actions or the homogeneous nature of the Catalan society. We divided the positive 
side of this horizontal dimension into two clear sections: one situated to the extreme, 
which includes categories affirming the illegitimacy of pro‑independence claims, the 
legitimacy of constitutional stances, or blaming the Catalan government and parties 
Fig. 2  Multiple correspondence analysis: joint plot of category points. Note: Variable principal normali‑
sation. All variables are active but “Side”, which is included as a supplementary variable. Total inertia of 
the model = 0.863. Source: Authors’ own elaboration
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for the situation. Closer to the origin appear those categories asserting the heteroge‑
neity of the Catalan society, criticising pro‑independence positions and actions, or 
dividing up the blame between Spanish and Catalan political actors.
Then, when we project the “Side” variable on the MCA solution, we observe 
that the variable’s categories nicely fit into the two‑dimensional space. So partisan 
stances are projected on the lower half of the plot coinciding with the distribution of 
evaluative arguments (pro‑independence articles on the negative side of the horizon‑
tal dimension, third‑way positions to the middle and constitutionalist/anti‑independ‑
entist articles on the far right). Projections of articles with non‑identifiable political 
positionings appear about the middle of the top half of the plot. Finally, in the case 
of articles coded as “neutral”, since they usually involve balanced political evalua‑
tions, they are projected in the bottom half of the plot, about the middle of the hori‑
zontal dimension. In any case, we will not consider these neutral articles as partisan, 
since, according to our definition, they do not exhibit a clear political preference in 
the text.
Predominance of the partisan “hat”
Returning to the hypothesis about the predominance of the partisan role in politi‑
cal scientists’ interventions, we confirm across the whole period that articles classi‑
fied as pro‑independence/sovereigntist, constitutionalist/anti‑independence, or “third 
way” amount to 55.5% of the total. Within these articles with a partisan stance, a 
majority supports a pro‑independence stance (30.7%), while texts identified with 
constitutionalist and third‑way options represent 11.9 and 12.9%, respectively. In 
turn, the proportion of articles adopting a neutral positioning amounts to only 4.1%. 
Finally, those articles where we cannot identify a political position represent 38.8% 
of the total.
Figure 3 shows a more fine‑grained view. The general pattern (represented by the 
average lines) is also present across the different stages of the crisis—pre‑procés, 
procés, and post‑procés. Besides, the interest among political scientists on the sub‑
ject (measured every six months) correlates with the main political events in the cri‑
sis. Therefore, during the pre‑procés period, the highest level of interest appears in 
the second semester of 2010, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the 
Statut of Autonomy (June 2010). There is also an upsurge of attention in the second 
half of 2012, coinciding with the events of the first massive Diada demonstration in 
September, and the start of the procés stage with the election of November 2012. 
During the procés period, the peaks in Fig.  3 coincide with three major political 
events—the campaigns of the 2014 referendum, the 2015 Catalan election, and the 
events that resulted in the October 2017 referendum and the unilateral declaration of 
independence. The second semester of 2017 also coincides with the start of the post‑
procés period and the application of the article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and 
the regional elections of 20 December 2017.
The predominance of partisan interventions would be more obvious if it were 
not for the predominance of non‑aligned interventions over partisan ones in 
some of the periods of higher salience of the issue. This is the case of the second 
semesters of 2012 and 2015, where the proportion of non‑partisan interventions 
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reaches 53.5% and 52.5%, respectively. We can explain this by the fact that these 
periods coincide with electoral campaigns and that a substantial part of those 
interventions corresponds to some kind of pre‑ or post‑electoral analysis (42.9% 
and 61.9% in 2012 and 2015, respectively). Also, in the moments of more 
intense contentiousness, during the second half of 2017, most of the non‑iden‑
tifiable interventions (58.3 percent, about seven texts) corresponded to articles 
focusing on the December 2017 election. In sum, these non‑aligned articles pub‑
lished during electoral or post‑electoral periods account for almost 40 per cent 
of the total in the non‑identified or neutral categories.
It is also remarkable how partisan and non‑partisan interventions differ in 
their intentions to influence on other actors’ behaviour by proposing courses of 
action (prognostic approach). While only 19.4% of the opinion pieces classi‑
fied as “non‑identified” contains such recommendations, this percentage is sig‑
nificantly higher among partisan interventions. Therefore, a great majority of 
pro‑independence and third‑way articles (69.3 and 93.8, respectively) adopt a 
prognostic approach, as well as a high proportion of neutral texts (61.3%). In 
contrast, only 25% of constitutionalist articles qualifies as prognostic, which is 
probably a reflection of the eminently reactive stance adopted by actors on this 














Not idenfiable Parsan (average)
Neutral/not idenfiable (average)
Fig. 3  Sides supported in articles (by semester) (2010–2018). Note: The vertical axis represents counts. 
The horizontal axis represents semesters (first and second) within a year. Averages capture the variation 
across the three main periods analysed in the article. In the figure, these roughly correspond to the bian‑
nual sections: pre‑procés (2010–1 to 2012–1), procés (2012–2 to 2017–2), and post‑procés (2018) peri‑
ods. Source: Authors’ own elaboration
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Opinion leaders for the independence cause
Figure  4 further shows the asymmetric distribution of individual contributions 
by political scientists participating in the Catalan secession public debate. Of the 
53 authors identified, just one of them (who we will call “PS1”) produced 24% 
of the articles. Another three (labelled PS2, PS3, and PS4) were responsible for 
35.2%. And four other individuals produced 19.4% of the articles. The rest of the 
texts (21.3%) spread across forty‑five different authors. Therefore, what Spanish 
political scientists say about the Catalan independence crisis is greatly dependent 
on these eight highly active and more visible individuals, who account for almost 
80% of all interventions. The fact that most of these people enjoyed regular col‑
umns in the analysed newspapers suggests that the asymmetric pattern in inter‑
ventions and the likelihood to become an opinion‑maker is not just a matter of 
personal motivation or interest in the topic, but clearly depends on the role of the 
media in giving voice to specific individuals, who in many cases exhibit opinions 
quite close to the outlet’s editorial line.
The hypothesis about the prevalence of partisan interventions at the individual 
level is greatly confirmed too. Of the 53 authors identified, 48 of them have pro‑
duced at least one article explicitly taking sides on the conflict, and in the case of 
42 authors, they adopted a partisan approach in at least half of their interventions. 
In contrast, only 21 authors wrote some non‑partisan text (neutral or not identifi‑



















































































































Third way (i.e. federalism, dialogue)
Pro-unionist/constuonalist/an-independenst
Pro-independenst/sovereignist
Fig. 4  Sides supported by each individual author (2010–2018). Note: The horizontal axis represents each 
of the 53 different authors analysed. The bars represent the stacked total number of articles written by 
every individual classified on every category of the “Side” variable (“Pro‑independence”, “Constitution‑
alist/anti‑independence”, “Third way”, “Neutral”, and “Not identifiable”). Source: Authors’ own elabora‑
tion
 J. Real-Dato et al.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the positions taken by the authors. First, we 
observe that the group of more publicly active scholars (those above ten articles 
along the nine‑years period) combine to some extent partisan and non‑partisan inter‑
ventions, though distributions vary across individuals. Thus, positions are predomi‑
nantly partisan for only half of this group. These data only partially confirm our 
second hypothesis about the predominance of partisan stances among more visible 
scholars.
We also observe differences in terms of the consistency or homogeneity of par‑
tisan positions. Thus, the three scholars with more interventions (PS1 to PS3, who 
jointly accumulate almost half of the articles) are clearly aligned with pro‑independ‑
ence positions. Jointly, they are responsible for 82.5% of all pro‑independence arti‑
cles, which makes them key opinion figures of this camp in the public debate. In this 
respect, we must also mention that the involvement of two of these authors went far 
beyond media interventions, as they also occupied relevant positions in the institu‑
tional structure created to support the secessionist process.
Furthermore, while most pro‑independence texts by PS1 and PS3 are concen‑
trated during the procés period (92.3% and 92.9%, respectively), in the case of PS3 
the articles aligning with pro‑independence positions spread over the whole period. 
This individual is also remarkable because of the discourse eminently prognostic 
(81.4% of the entire production) and focused on providing clear theoretical argu‑
ments for secession, even before the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
in 2010. This makes this individual the only one in our study that could probably 
raise to the status of public agenda setter, in the sense that he is capable of raising 
awareness on issues or paths of action that later would be followed by main political 
actors.
The homogeneity of partisan stances within this group of most active, pro‑inde‑
pendence individuals contrasts with the less homogeneous positions of the rest of 
authors with more than ten articles (PS4 to PS8). Apart from the clear opposition 
(except for PS4, which is ambiguous in some articles) towards secession, their posi‑
tions vary along time without any clear pattern of evolution.
Politically oriented experts
With respect to the compatibility of partisanship and academic standards, the data 
confirm that most articles (61.2%) contain academic elements (concepts, empirical 
evidence, mention to political science theories, or authority arguments). This pro‑
portion is rather stable across partisan and non‑partisan interventions (59.7% among 
those labelled as pro‑independence, 61.4 among articles taking the constitutional‑
ist side, 62.5 for those advocating for some kind of third‑way option, and 66.7 in 
articles that did not opt for any side of the conflict). Only in the case of the articles 
categorised as neutral, the proportion of texts using academic elements was signifi‑
cantly much lower (38.1%).
Therefore, from the roles mentioned in the theoretical section (scientist/expert, 
politically oriented expert, and partisan), it is the second one which clearly domi‑
nates the others, with about one‑third of all interventions fitting in this category. 
However, there is also a significant proportion of articles (28%) where participants 
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adopt the role of scientist/expert. In line with our categorisation, 83% of the articles 
where the author adopts such role use exclusively an analytical approach.
The rest of articles does not include any academic content, and they are divided 
between plainly partisan interventions (which amount to a remarkable 22.4%) and 
interventions where the author acts as a “non‑partisan commentator” (16.4%).
The influence of the media system
Finally, we examine our third hypothesis—that interventions appear according to the 
media’s sympathies for different sides of the conflict. Figure 5 shows mixed evidence 
on this. In the case of newspapers exclusively published in Catalan language (Ara, 
Avui, El Punt, and El Punt Avui), we observe that partisan opinion pieces authored 
by academic political scientists are overwhelmingly aligned with pro‑independence 
positions. The same applies in the case of constitutionalist positions, to Abc and El 
Mundo, two Madrid newspapers with a conservative editorial line (Chaqués et al., 
2015).
We also observe that El Periódico and El País, two newspapers opposed to the 
secession but with liberal editorial lines, published most of the articles showing a 
neutral and third‑way position. Figure 5 also shows that a significant proportion of 
the pieces in these newspapers (46.2% and 55.2%, respectively) corresponds to arti‑
cles labelled as constitutionalist or pro‑independence. However, regarding the latter, 
it is also remarkable how in these two newspapers pro‑independence articles disap‑
pear during 2017 (in El País during the second half of the year), coinciding with the 
moments of highest political tensions. In the case of El País, most pro‑independence 
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Pro-independence Constuonalist Third way Neutral
Fig. 5  Distribution of articles with a political positioning by newspaper (2010–2018). Note: The figure 
represents the distribution of pieces (counts) across newspapers during the studied period. Though pieces 
labelled as “neutral” are not considered partisan, they have been included since they imply a political 
positioning. Source: Authors’ own elaboration
 J. Real-Dato et al.
paragraphs, who was a regular columnist in the newspaper. The disappearing of pro‑
independence articles written by political scientists coincided with the sacking of 
this columnist in the Autumn of 2017.
Regarding La Vanguardia, we observe a high proportion of pro‑independence 
articles (83.3% of all pieces published in this newspaper). The author of most of 
them (37 out of 40) was one of the highly active authors mentioned in a previous 
section, who was a regular columnist in this newspaper during the period we ana‑
lyse. It must be noted that though La Vanguardia’s editorial position on the issue of 
Catalan independence changed over time—from a sympathetic treatment of the Cat‑
alan government’s claims until 2013 to an anti‑independence stance in the following 
years8—this newspaper kept publishing the articles written by its pro‑independence 
columnist during the whole period.
In sum, the previous evidence partially supports our expectation about the group‑
ing of articles in outlets according to their political positioning. However, this occurs 
mostly in those newspapers with more polarised positions on the issue, while more 
liberal newspapers are to some extent open to contributions that do not entirely fit 
with their editorial lines.
Conclusions
The evidence presented in this article has shed light on a quite neglected topic: the 
role (or roles) political scientists play in highly contentious public debates. As Real‑
Dato and Verzichelli (2021) show in the introduction to this special issue, the roles 
political scientists adopt in the public debates may affect their visibility and the per‑
ceived social relevance of the discipline before the general public. In this respect, 
such perception may result when political scientists use their disciplinary expert 
knowledge to enlighten the public about hidden or scarcely known aspects of pub‑
lic problems or political conflicts. But they can also be relevant by helping to sup‑
port and legitimise specific political positions or alternatives, even if such approach 
implies some friction with scientific standards.
In the highly conflictual political debates around the Catalonian independence 
question, the partisan role trumps the scientific/expert “hat”. Though political sci‑
entists’ partisan interventions may usually appear in tandem with academic ele‑
ments, mentioning specialised concepts, empirical evidence, or scientific theories, 
these elements are subordinated. In this type of interventions, the authors mostly 
appear in their condition of members of a political community than as members of 
the scientific community. To some extent, such approach is understandable (both in 
8 The watershed between both editorial lines was marked by the replacement of the newspapers’ direc‑
tor in December 2013, who two years later founded a new pro‑independence newspaper (see “La Van‑
guardia cambia de director para descolgarse del proceso soberanista”, Eldiario.es, 13/12/2013, available 
at https:// www. eldia rio. es/ polit ica/ Vangu ardia‑ direc tor‑ desco lgarse‑ proce so‑ sober anista_ 0_ 20682 9738. 
html (accessed 01/06/2020)).
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normative and behavioural terms) when an individual’s basic political identity and 
beliefs are in question.
The article has also offered evidence on the role the mass media can play as una‑
voidable intermediaries between political scientists and the public. First, they affect 
the public visibility of political scientists in general, as the huge differences in the 
presence of political scientists across newspapers demonstrate. Second, media selec‑
tivity also contributes to accentuate the asymmetries observed in the public partici‑
pation of political scientists, by providing some of them a privileged access to the 
public in the form of regular slots. Third, mass media also reinforce the prevalence 
of partisanship in the public interventions of political scientists, through the selec‑
tion of individuals with partisan opinions in tune with their editorial lines. Finally, 
we have also demonstrated that scholars’ media visibility is not completely depend‑
ent on adopting partisan stances, since media outlets also demand non‑politicised 
analyses.
In sum, this article has shown that highly contentious political debates may rep‑
resent an opportunity for political scientists to increase their visibility and social rel‑
evance before the public. However, there is also the danger that the combination 
of partisan arguments and scientific elements might erode the legitimacy of politi‑
cal science knowledge before that same public. In the end, the problem could be 
that what helps some political scientists to become socially (and politically) relevant 
could also negatively affect the social relevance of political science as a disciplinary 
knowledge. Further research on the topic should shed light on this crucial issue.
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